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The title actually assigned to me for discussion on this occasion 
had a slightly more academic ring than the one I have chosen. 
I see no reason why, even before this group, a “spade” need be 
defined as “an elongated instrument by which perspiration and 
energy are applied to the movement of loose material from one 
place to another”; let’s just call it a “spade.” Let’s recognize that 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 19351 gave to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission managerial and directive 
powers in connection with the gas and electric utilities under its 
jurisdiction. 
Statutory Basis for Financial Regulation 
Before we examine or attempt to appraise the actual results 
of S.E.C. financial management let us briefly review the statutory 
directives under which the Commission operates. This review will 
provide the outline for my subsequent discussion of the Commis- 
sion’s exercise of its discretionary powers under the law. We all 
understand that the technique of exercising control over the 
financial affairs of utilities by the S.E.C. is accomplished by, first, 
a requirement of registration of all public utility holding com- 
panies,2 second, the requirement that registered holding companies 
and their subsidiaries can proceed with certain financial trans- 
actions only after the declaration describing a proposed transaction 
has been either exempted or made effective by order of the Secur- 
ities and Exchange Commission,3 or, third, the exercise of the 
Commission’s power to direct those transactions incident to the 
disintegration of holding company systems.4 Please bear in mind 
that these controls extend only to those operating gas and electric 
utilities and holding companies falling within the jurisdiction of 
the law on the basis of a statutory 10 per cent voting security 
relationship between parent and subsidiary companies. 
*Editor’s Note: Professor Waterman’s paper and the discussions by 
Professors Hall and Troxel which follow it were given at the meeting of the 
Transportation and Public Utilities Section of the American Economic Asso- 
ciation held in Chica on December 30, 1947. ’Because the paper and discus- 
sions are certain to of interest to the members of the American Finance 
Association, decision has been made to include them here. 
1Public Act No. 335, 74th Congreae. 
Ybid., Sec. 6, 7, 10, 12. 
szbid, Sec. 5. 
ribid., ssc, 11. 
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Section 7 of the Holding Company Act comprises the heart of 
statutory control over issuance of utility securities. It is this sec- 
tion which at once prohibits the use of no-par stock and unsecured 
bonds for new financing by other than operating utilities6 and at 
the same time grants to the S.E.C. discretionary control over a11 
issues in light of such circumstances 8s the adaptability of each 
security issued to the over-all financial structure, the earning 
capacity of the issuer, and the underwriting fees paid in connec- 
tion with a public offering.’ In fact this section of the Act sounds 
like the outline of an academic course in financial management 
designed to indoctrinate students of business in the principles of 
finance which company managers should apply in connection 
with their capital-raising activities. 
The scope of the S.E.C.’s powers of financial management is 
further extended by Section 10 of the Act which subjects the 
acquisition of utility assets and securities by a holding company 
or an operating unit to the scrutiny of the S.E.C. The Commis- 
sion has the authority hereunder to pass judgment on prices and 
value,s and to prescribe terms and conditions to utility acquisi- 
tions, including the right to determine what is a reasonable price 
that one utility may pay for an interest in another.9 
The same sort of directive powers with respect to the sale of 
assets and securities by a holding company are handed to the 
S.E.C. by Section 12 of the Act which empowers the Commission 
to condition any such sale in terms of prices, fees, and commis- 
sions.10 Under this section, also, all intra-system loans are pro- 
hibited except as conditioned by the Commission and any funds 
paid for retirement of securities or payment of dividends either 
by an operating company or by a holding company can be accom- 
plished only as directed by rule or by order of the Commission.11 
By indirection, the S.E.C. is given vast discretionary powers over 
financial management under the divestment provision of the Hold- 
ing Company Act. The disposition of holding company assets 
obviously necessitates determination of value and price, and the 
S.E.C. is the final determinant in deciding what is “fair and equit- 




9ZbX: See. 10iei.. * 
10z&, S&.-i2’(d). 
I l Z M ,  Sec. 12(b) and (c). 
U Z U ,  See. 11 ( e ) .  
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Administrative Discrution by the S.E.C. 
This evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that the S.E.C. 
does have managerial authority over the financial affairs of the 
utilities under its jurisdiction via the Public Utility Act of 1935. 
It is incumbent on the Commission to administer its statutory 
responsibilities and thus to inject itself into the management of 
the utilities. It does so by rule and by order. Perhaps the prime 
example of management by rule is the well-known Rule U-5013 
which requires competitive bidding for all utility securities 
destined for public sale and derives its authority from the Com- 
mission’s power to regulate prices and underwriting fees in con- 
nection with security sales. 
It is impossible in the time allotted either to the pEparation 
or reading of this paper to accomplish a comprehensive survey 
of the S.E.C.’s managerial policies and activities bearing on public 
utility finance. My purpose will be accomplished if I can describe 
a few leading situations with which the Commission has dealt and 
comment on them in a way that will stimulate thought and dis- 
cussion. 
First I would like to present a case which I think typifies the 
managerial attitude of the S.E.C. with respect to utility financial 
structures. Late in 1939 Consumers Power Company filed a 
declaration under Section 7 of the law proposing to sell bonds 
publicly and to sell common stock to its parent, Commonwealth 
and Southern Corporation.14 Section 10 of the Act was involved 
also in Commonwealth’s acquisition of its subsidiary’s common 
stock. In a divided decision of the S.E.C. the right of Consumers 
Power Company to sell all of the requested $28,594,000 of bonds 
was denied; that portion ($18,594,000) designed to refinance an 
existing issue was cleared as an interest-saving refunding opera- 
tion.15 Even the $10,000,000 was technically approved as being 
“for the purpose of financing the declarant as a public-utility com- 
pany,”16 but this additional amount did not pass muster by the 
Commission in the exercise of its managerial judgment that these 
bonds were “necessary or appropriate to the economic and efficient 
operation” of Consumers Power Company.17 The Commission 
13General Rules and Regulations under the Public Utility Holding a m -  
pany Act of 1935 (U. S. Government Printing Office), 1946. 
14Holding Company Act, Release No. 1864. 
16Public Act No. 333, 74th Congress (PUHC Act) ; Section 7(c) (2) (A). 
16ZW, See. 7 ( c )  (2)(B). 
17Zbid, Sec 7(d) (3). 
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majority decision in this matter rested on the fact that the com- 
pany’s balance sheet debt ratios would be higher than those of 
other utilities, and thus not “appropriate,” and on the further fact 
that since common stock could be sold to raise an equivalent sum, 
the use of bonds was not “necessary.” This was distinctly a 
managerial decision rendered in face of the fact that investment 
bankers stood ready to buy the total amount of bonds at a price 
to cost the company 5.07 per cent per annum, that interest cov- 
erage pro fomna would be three times, and that leverage benefits 
would undoubtedly accrue both to preferred and common stock 
because the new funds would be added to a working investment 
which, in 1939, was earning 5.5 per cent on a total pro forma 
capitalization of $255.5 million. 
Dissenting Commissioners18 did not agree that the $10,000,000 
issue of “new money” bonds was either unnecessary or inappro- 
priate, It is significant that this disagreement serves to emphasize 
the managerial function of the S.E.C.; the arguments presented 
on the matter, if not couched in such formal and legalistic lan- 
guage, would have sounded like arguments among company direc- 
tors in the process of determining financial policy. 
Whether the managerial influence of the S.E.C. on the capital 
structures of utilities under its jurisdiction is consistently sound 
by virtue of its method of testing almost exclusively by balance 
sheet ratios is a serious question. Although the personnel of the 
S.E.C. “board of directors” (Commissioners) has completely 
changed since the days of the case described above, decisions on 
similar matters have been settled by similar reasoning, and we 
find a most recent case clinging to the same standards. In passing 
judgment on the indenture provisions of a bond issue by Duquesne 
Light Company19 the Commission insisted on a change in those 
provisions which would freeze surplus at a figure higher than that 
which the company proposed, thus limiting more restrictively the 
possibilities of future dividend payments. This move was justified 
by the S.E.C. as a means “to protect bondholders against diminu- 
tion of the properties securing the debt”20 and apparently ignored 
the pro forma fact that bond interest was being earned 5.99 
times.21 
18Healy and Mathews, Commissioners. 
IeHolding Company A&, Release No. 7712. 
mZbid., p. 6. 
ZlZbid., p. 6. 
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All this leads to my conclusion that the S.E.C. places unwar- 
ranted faith in book values of assets and gives insufficient weight 
to real financial ability to pay out on security contracts. It may 
be true that some relationship does exist between the now dehy- 
drated property accounts of operating utilities and expected future 
earnings, but to pretend that those assets have any real value 
beyond their earning capacity is not realistic. Real protection to 
bondholders and real value to stockholders rest squarely on ability 
to pay which in turn depends on earning power. If the S.E.C. is 
correct in setting its “appropriate” capitalization standards in 
terms of ratios of principal amounts to book asset figures at a time 
when money rates are measured by 2.70 per cent to 3.00 per cent 
interest and 3.50 per cent to 4.00 per cent preferred dividends, 
how effective would those standards be, should we return to inter- 
est rates of the nineteen-twenties which might double these con- 
tractual money costs? It i s  assumed that the S.E.C. is advocating 
conservative standards, but if 50 per cent debt is conservative at 
3 per cent money costs, it cannot be conservative at 6 per cent 
rates. 
It is not my suggestion that the principal amount of debt should 
be ignored in determining what is sound financial management of 
utility capital structures; it is my contention that, in the exercise 
of its discretion, the S.E.C. should take a more realistic view of the 
basic factor of value in utility situations, namely, earnings. If, 
then, the S.E.C. and the utilities wish to preserve those values 
against the deterioration which has characterized railroad securi- 
ties they could better agree to programs of future debt retirement 
in static or contracting situations which would require reduction 
of capitalization from the top down. 
Commissioner McEntire has well put the financial problem of 
public utilities confronted with tremendous needs for capital 
expansion. He reasonably requests that the financing of these 
capital needs be kept on a sound basis.22 It is my hope that man- 
agement by the utilities, by the S.E.C., and by state regulatory 
authorities will measure this soundness by value and not by book 
costs, even though these book figures may have the blessing of 
both the S.E.C. and the Federal Power Commission. At best such 
so-called asset figures are but interesting historical facts ; interest, 
=“An Analysis of the Capital Structure of Electric Utilities Yesterday, 
Today and Tomorrow”, Address of Richard B. McEntire, Commissioner, Secttr- 
ities and Exchange Commission, before the National Association of Railmd 
and Utilities Commissioners at Boston, Massachusetts, July 17,1947. 
46 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
dividends and principal will be paid in the future out of funds 
derived from future operations and earnings. 
I have mentioned previously the responsibilities of the S.E.C. 
under Section 10 of the Holding Company Act, the chief of which 
is to exercise its judgment with respect to values of utility securi- 
ties when bought or sold by companies under the Holding Company 
Act jurisdiction of the Commission. In this connection it is inter- 
esting to note that earnings comprise the entire basis for the com- 
mission’s determination. In September of this year the S.E.C. 
approved the purchase by a registered holding company (Penn- 
sylvania Power and Light Company) of three small operating 
utilitieszs whose net property “values,” as expressed in terms of 
original cost less depreciation, equaled $492,000. The purchase of 
complete interest in these properties was approved at a base price 
of $675,000, this being 12.2 thnes the current average net income 
of the combined companies! Apparently value for purchase and 
sale was based on a concept different from that of the value in 
support of corporate securities. This is not an isolated instance, 
but a fair reflection of the S.E.C.’s attitude toward value in such 
cases. In January, 1947, the Commmission approved the sale of a 
gas company whose depreciated original cost was $883,000 at a 
price of $361,000.24 The logic of a decision of this sort is apparent 
in face of the fact that future average earnings, after investing 
$126,000 more capital, were estimated at only $28,000. I trust, 
however, that should occasion arise the Commission would not 
approve $504,500 of bonds, this amount being 50 per cent of the 
net cost including the new investment. 
As a matter of fact I doubt that there are any real grounds for 
distinguishing between “valuation for capitalization” and “valua- 
tion for purchase and sale” in the public utility industry. I can 
think of no business situation where there is greater significance 
in future earning capacity and correspondingly less in historical 
cost when it comes to judging the position of creditors and owners ; 
there could be nothing more hapless than a utility without earning 
capacity but with a fancy capitalization based on cost. It is true 
that our utility regulatory system looks largely to cost in the reg- 
ulation of * and earnings, but regulation operates primarily 
to set a ceiling and not to provide a subsidy in support of earnings. 
The cold economic facts of life in this respect are amply demon- 
=Holding Company Act, Release No. 7749. 
**Holding Company Act, &lease No. 7144 (re sale of gas utility asdn 
by New Jersey Power and Light Co.). 
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strated in the history of the interurban railways and perhaps in 
the railroad field. 
Thus in its ventures into the management of utility financial 
structures the Securities and Exchange Commission may be ac- 
cused of some lack of realism and some lack of consistency. It is 
suggested that within its broad administrative powers the Com- 
mission could apply the dictates of sound finance based on the real 
source of economic value, namely, earning power. Capital struc- 
tures fitted to the future earning potentials of utilities could be 
regulated more realistically, and in case of a downward trend of 
future earnings such a basis would prove more flexible and more 
susceptible to a necessary reduction of debt. 
The Problem of Competitive Bidding 
In the short time alloted to this paper I hesitate even to mention 
the words “compulsory competitive bidding.” Yet the imposition 
of Rule U-50 by the S.E.C. certainly represents a significant inroad 
into the realm of utility financial management. In general this 
rule requires that all securities offered for sale by utilities under 
the Holding Company Act jurisdiction of the S.E.C. shall be sub- 
mitted for competitive bidding, and I would like to provoke some 
discussion on this subject. 
May I raise the question whether competitive bidding is effec- 
tive as a substitute for sound financial management? May I ques- 
tion whether it leads to compliance with that provision of the 
Holding Company Act which stipulates that the interests of inves- 
tors be considered in the process of regulation?25 May I further 
wonder whether the consumers and general public have benefited 
materially from competitive bidding operations? These are ques- 
tions that I raise but do not answer, because I am not completely 
satisfied in my own mind as to the proper reply. 
When I see a series of competitive bids for high-grade utility 
bonds such as that for the Detroit Edison issue of September, 1947, 
and find four offers ranging all the way from a low basis of 2.7243 
per cent to a high of 2.7473 per cent, I wonder “what the heck.” 
Even on $60,000,000 the difference would mean a saving of only 
$13,800 per annum in interest cost, certainly a pittance per share 
on the company’s 10,000,000 common shares outstanding and not 
very much per customer per year for possible division among some 
46Public Act No. 333, 74th Congress, Section 1 (b). 
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85,000 customers. Further, crediting the management of the com- 
pany with more than a modicum of managerial intelligence, I can- 
not but assume that a negotiated sale would have been effected at 
or near the long-term government bond interest rates which were 
prevalent for high-grade utility bonds early in September of 1947. 
From the standpoint of the investor there is nothing in com- 
petitive bidding which protects him from the risks of changing 
money rates inherent in high-grade, low-yield securities. The 
original purchasers of these Detroit Edison bonds, for instance, 
paid $101.125 on a 2.70 per cent yield basis, and on this date 
(November 14, 1947) they see their investment priced at 100 on a 
2.75 per cent yield basis. This represents a loss of 1.125 points on 
the sale value and aggregates a loss of $675,000. Although this 
same or greater loss might have occurred following a negotiated 
sale, I am only emphasizing that the pressure for the last nickel 
resulting from competitive bidding certainly does nothing to mini- 
mize the risk to the investor whose welfare is specifically men- 
tioned in the statute as a charge to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
Coincident with the advent of competitive bidding there has been 
a marked reduction in bankers' spreads incurred in the distribution 
of utility securities. It should be noted, however, that  the down- 
ward trend of spreads had begun before May, 1941, when Rule 
U-50 went into effect. According to the compilation of the S.E.C. 
s t a f f 2 6  the weighted average spread for bonds (secured) in 1936 
was 2.16 points from whence i t  headed generally downward to  1.70 
points in 1940. Since then the average spread for  like securities 
has further declined to a low of .62 points in 1942 and up to .83 
points in 1946. Again, if we can assume some degree of bargain- 
ing skill on the part of utility managements, it is likely that this 
same trend would have developed in negotiated deals under market 
conditions which were increasingly influenced throughout deals 
under market conditions which were increasingly influenced 
throughout this period by direct placements and institutional in- 
vestment demands. Incidentally, it  might be noted that a reduc- 
tion of spread from 1.70 to .60 points on a typical thirty-year bond 
issue would approximate a reduction in money cost of .033 (thirty- 
three thousandths) of 1 per cent per annum on a n  amortized basis. 
z6"Security Issues of Gas and Electric Utilities, 1935-46," Report of 
Public Utilities Division, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 22,1947). 
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When we move from these considerations affecting high-grade 
bonds to the circumstances surrounding the bidding for lower- 
grade securities such as preferred and common stocks we encounter 
the fact that under uncertain market conditions bids are not always 
forthcoming. So far these cases have been neither numerous nor 
serious, but they do suggest the difficulties inherent‘ in pricing risk 
securities in an unstable market. It seems only natural that the 
processes of valuation of higher risk securities should result in 
wider differences of judgment at all times and at some times so 
little confidence in any judgment that bids might be unjustifiably 
low or completely absent. The Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion itself so found recently and denied permission for the sale of 
common stock by Interstate Power Compafiy in connection with 
that company’s reorganization plan.27 Interstate received two bids 
for its common stock from an invitation designed to raise $8,635,500 
of equity money; the high bid was $4.05 per share, the low was 
$3.872422. The Commission determined that even the high 
price “would not effectuate a plan which would be fair and equit- 
able to the persons affected thereby.” These bids, incidentally, 
were made by bankers at a time when the Dow Jones utility stock 
average had just passed through 35 along with a general market 
unsettlement (September 7, 1947). 
Therefore, I can only conclude with questions about compulsory 
competitive bidding. Does it guarantee or even tend to assure that 
necessary financing can be consummated at prices and yields that 
are realistic? How can it significantly affect the cost of capital at 
the high-grade security level, if one assumes honest and reasonably 
intelligent utility management ? 
Conclusions 
In all, the decade of experience in financial regulation of gas 
and electric utilities by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
as affecting capitalizations, values, and security distribution, can 
not be marked as a period of operation which proves either the 
infallibility of S.E.C. management or even an improvement over 
private management. That utility managements have perhaps 
been more widely awakened to their financial responsibilities 
through association with the Public Utility Division of the S.E.C. 
may have been an incidental and beneficial result. These manage- 
ments may have bestirred themselves to improve their financial 
2’Holding Company Act, Release No. 7739. 
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status more expeditiously than they might otherwise have done. 
Let us credit the S.E.C. with the origination of a beneficial 
stimulus. But it does not follow that the Commission’s standards 
of financial management have been uniquely or consistently sound. 
As the Commission loses jurisdiction over gas and electric utilities 
I do not fear that financial standards will necessarily deteriorate. 
More do I fear that deterioration of standards may result from 
lack of motivation for management to do its best job under the 
arbitrary and unrealistic concepts born of the regulatory statutes 
and administered by the regulatory commissions. 
DISCUSSION 
JAMES K. HALL: Professor Waterman has directed his attention 
to the financial control exercised by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission over public utilities under the authority of the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. He has briefly outlined the 
statutory character of this control and its implementation by the 
S.E.C. He concludes that the Commission not only engages in the 
function of utility financial management, but is compelled to do 
so under the Act. With this we would agree. He appraises a 
decade of S.E.C. control over the finances of the gas and electric 
utilities which come within the purview of the Commission’s au- 
thority. In his judgment decisions of the S.E.C. regarding utility 
capitalizations, values, and security distribution have not proved 
to be of a better order than those of private managements; further, 
that as S.E.C. jurisdictional control recedes deterioration in the 
financial standards of private managements is not to be antici- 
pated. On the other hand, Professor Waterman is prepared to 
credit S.E.C. utility financial control with good moral effect on pri- 
vate managements in making them more aware of their responsi- 
bilities. 
S.E.C. decisions relating to utility capital structures in which, 
apparently, judgments have been formed largely on the basis of 
balance sheet ratios and not on earning capacity are questioned. 
It is Profesor Waterman’s view that “the S.E.C. places unwar- 
ranted faith in book values of assets and gives insufficient weight 
to real financial ability to pay out on security contracts.” In sup- 
port of this contention he cites the S.E.C. decision in the Con- 
sumers Power Company case1 which involved Sections 7 and 10 
1 Securities and Exchange Commission Decisions and Reports 444 (Dee. 
28,1939). The Consumers Power Company is an operating public utility with 
its operations confined to the State of Michigan. 
